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Abstract In the present essay we analyse the links between the emergence of new arms and 
forms of war-emergence, the phalanx and its hoplites, and the trieres at sea, its economic 
base, and the emergence of democracy in classical Greece. We propose that the unique till 
then in the world phalanx formation, led to the development of particular values and ethics, 
which again were the necessary conditions for the emergence of democracy, then again, a 
unique phenomenon. We then turn to seapower, which according to our analysis was a 
sufficient condition for the establishment and endurance of democracy, because seapower led 
to a community of economic interests, on which direct democracies like Ancient Athens, were 
based. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A fourth century Athenian orator, Demades, said that the theorika (payments out of the 
Athenian budget to the poorer citizens, to allow them to participate at the main Assembly 
days (40 per year) and to watch the four days theatrical contests, was the “glue of democracy” 
(Plutarch Moralia. 1011b) meaning that they established a community of interests in favour of 
democracy. The theorika made the majority of poorer citizens to have a stake in democracy. 
 Rich citizens on the other hand were also satisfied in general with democracy in the 
classical Athenian period (5
th – 4th centuries) although they were taxed through the system of 
liturgies, which had (again for the first time in history) a redistributive function.
1
 Rich and 
medium income citizens profited also from the general economic development in Athens, and 
apparently also in other maritime city-states (for which we have only fragmented information) 
such as the islands of Naxos, Samos and Chios in the Aegean sea, Megara in the northern 
section of the Isthmus of Corinth or Akragas and the major city of Syracuse in Sicily, or 
Croton in today’s south Italy etc.,2 and so were willing to support (or at least accept) direct 
democracy. 
But direct democracy as a political institution is much older than the introduction of the 
first theorika at the time of Pericles (after 450 B.C.). One of the preconditions for the 
emergence of democracy was the new type of warrior, the hoplites and the new tactics that 
                                                 
1
 See Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Ecclesia: A Collection of Articles 1976-1983 (Viborg: Special 
Trykkeriet-Vyborg, 1983), 1:19; Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes 
(Bristol: Classical Press, 1999), 315-318 and Nicholas Kyriazis, “Financing the Athenian State: Public Choice in 
the Age of Demosthenes,” European Journal of Law and Economics  27  (2009): 109-127. 
2
 See Eric W. Robinson, The First Democracies: Early Popular Government Outside Athens (Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 1997), 103-104, 117-118; Kurt A. Raauflaub and Robert W. Wallace, “Peoples Power and 
Egalitarian Trends in Archaic Greece,” in Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece, eds. K. A. Raaflaub, J. Ober, 
R. and W. Wallace, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2008), 49. 
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were developed as the most suitable form to accommodate the hoplites. The new battle 
tactical formation, the phalanx, led to the development of new values and ideals in the field of 
battle, which, once established, became widely accepted, and thus were introduced also in the 
political field. These were the values on which direct democracy rested. 
We maintain that no democracies developed without the existence of hoplites and 
phalanxes. But, in some cases, like Sparta, hoplites and phalanxes did not lead to full 
democracy, while in others it did. So, the emergence of the hoplites and the phalanx seems to 
be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of democracy. A further 
analysis of the ancient Greek city-states shows that those that transformed themselves into 
seapowers and maritime states, tended to be also democracies. Apart from Athens, the 
relationship between seapower and democracy finds its most clear example with the case of 
the island of Rhodes. Since 395 BC and then, democratic reforms became deeper and went 
hand in hand with the existence of strong navy and the rise of maritime commerce.
3
 Thus, 
seapower seems to be an almost sufficient condition for the emergence and endurance of 
democracy in classical times, and we explain this as being due to the establishment of a 
community of mainly economic interests. 
Although the hoplite and the phalanx were the main elements in the establishment in the 
new mindset ideas and values, it was not the only one. Other elements were the city-state 
environment, leading in most case to face to face cultures, religion and sports. Greek religion 
was “democratic” in its working, as portrayed by the Assembly of the gods were women 
goddess had equal speaking and voting rights, as well as the absence of an established caste of 
                                                 
3
 See Eric W. Robinson, Democracy Beyond Athens: Popular Government in the Greek Classical Age 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 236. 
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priests.
4
 Sports also, as institutionalised in various athletic games as the Olympics, Nemean, 
Pythian, Panathenean, Isthmian, Heraean etc contributed to an egalitarian set of values and 
ideas.
5
  
The essay is organised as follows: In the first section, we trace the development of the 
hoplites, the introduction of the phalanx as a battle formation, and its economic basis. In the 
second, we discuss the emergence of new values and how these values were transferred to the 
political field, and led to the introduction of democracy and to democratic values. In the third, 
we analyse the emergence of Athens as a maritime power, the link between seapower and 
democratic values and the community of interests on which the durability of democracy was 
based. This is followed by our conclusions. 
 
THE HOPLITES, THE PHALANX AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW VALUES  
“The connection between democracy and the militia principle has long been 
recognized; it takes little insight to perceive that those who vote for war also commit 
themselves to fight in it”.6  That this is not universally true is demonstrated by the fact that 
during the 4
th
 century BC, Athens and many other city-states voted for war, but used mainly 
mercenaries. So, the commitment was for financial resources first, and for military service 
sometimes as a second. A particularly strong example are the Phoceans, who decided on war, 
                                                 
4
 Nicholas Kyriazis, and Economou, Emmanouil  Marios L., “Property Rights and Democratic Values in Bronze 
Age and Archaic Greece,” MPRA Paper 42399 (University Library of Munich, Germany, 2012). 
5
 Nicholas Kyriazis and Economou Emmanouil Marios L., “Macroculture, Sports and Democracy in Classical 
Greece,” Paper Presented at the 25th Heilbronn Symposion in Economics and the Social Sciences, June 21-24th, 
2012, in Heilbronn; Nicholas Kyriazis and Economou Emmanouil Marios L., “Macroculture, Sports and 
Democracy in Classical Greece,” European Journal of Law and Economics (forthcoming). 
6
 See John Keegan, Introduction to Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2009), xii. 
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plundered the treasure of the oracle at Delphi, and used the proceeds to buy the services of 
mercenaries.
7
 What has been not sufficiently analysed, as far as we know, is that the 
emergence of the hoplites and the phalanx led to particular values on which democracy was 
based. These values that emerged on the battlefield became democratic values. 
The hoplite, the heavily armed infantryman emerged during the late geometric age 
(during the 8
th
 century BC and later). He was armed with a heavy round shield, the hoplon 
(from which he took his name) that covered the body up to the upper legs, greaves, a bronze 
or leather armour for his torso and back, and a bronze helmet (at the time usually of the 
Corinthian type which enclosed his head, leaving only slits for his eyes).
8
 Offensive weapons 
were a spear with an iron tip on a two to three meters wooden shaft and a short sword.
9
  
This equipment was new, and unique, developing only in central and southern Greece, 
linked both to economic and geographic factors. The economic one was the establishment of 
independent farmers, who owned the land they cultivated and were not tenants or slaves. The 
most prosperous of them could afford the hoplites equipment, which was financed and owned 
by themselves. The geographic factor was the morphology of the area, which did not favour 
the development of large bodies of cavalry, as in eastern countries, but also the area of 
Thessaly in central Greece. The areas were hoplites developed lacked adequate pasturelands 
for large herds of horses.          
 Lighter types of infantry like archers, javelin throwers and slingers could have 
                                                 
7
 Michael B. Sakellariou, “Towards Greek Unity,” in History of the Greek Nation, Γ2 (Athens: Ekdotiki 
Athinon, 1972), 34-95 (in Greek). 
8
 For descriptions of Greek armies and armour, see Alexandros Despotopoulos (1972), “The Art of War of the 
Greeks, 1100-336,”  in History of the Greek Nation, Γ2 (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1972), 192-235, (in Greek); 
Nicholas Sekunda, “The Ancient Greeks,” Osprey Elite 7 (1986): 4-12. 
9
 Nicholas Kyriazis and Xenophon Paparrigopoulos, “War and Democracy in Ancient Greece,” European 
Journal of Law and Economics (2012): DOI 10.1007/s10657-012-9352-1. 
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developed, and were used, but only in small numbers, their use not being a battle deciding 
factor. We believe that this was due to the fact that the new hoplites defensive armour offered 
adequate protection against the offensive power of the light infantry’s weapons. Also, even 
when the hoplites confronted cavalry, either Greek (Thessalians) or foreign (Persians) they 
usually emerged victorious, partly also because ancient cavalry (at least to the second half of 
the 4
th
 century) lacked offensive power against the phalanx formation.
10
 Ancient cavalrymen 
were inhibited in their stability on horseback because they lacked stirrups and adequate sadles 
(in contrast to eg., medieval knights). 
In order to be effective, the hoplites had to be used in new efficient formations. So, the 
phalanx emerged, a new and revolutionary formation. Up to then, both in Greece and in the 
east, battles were decided in individual “melées”, where aristocrats battled usually each other 
and also mixed in battle against each other, as Homer vividly portrays these combats. In the 
east, archery both from horsemen and infantry, was the battle-deciding weapon, and close 
hand-to-hand combat occurred only when one of the adversaries had been weakened.  
 Due to this type of combat, ancient eastern armies (with the exception of very few 
noblemen, kings and their close relatives and bodyguards) lacked heavy defensive armament. 
Their shields were usually smaller and lighter than the hoplon, their body armour consisted of 
mainly leather with sometimes metal scales, or none at all, and their helmets covered, if 
carried, only the top of the head, leaving the face unprotected.
11
 
                                                 
10
 The first indications that the phalanx formation could intercept a cavalry formation became obvious as early as 
510 BC, before the Greek-Persian wars of 490-479 BC, when the Spartan phalanx intercepted the Thessalian 
cavalry by using special techniques (mainly by amplifying its flanks). See Alfred S. Bradford, Leonidas and the 
Kings of Sparta: Mightiest Warriors, Fairest Kingdom (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 69. 
11
 For ancient non-Greek armies see Nicholas Sekunda, “The Persian Army 560-330 BC”, Osprey Elite 42 
(1992): 5-10; Mark Healy, “The Ancient Assyrians”, Osprey Elite 39 (1991): 3-12 and Mark Healy, “New 
Kingdom Egypt,” Osprey Elite 40 (1992): 5-24. 
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The Greek phalanx was a tight formation, usually 8-10 ranks deep, where every hoplite 
covered one square meter of ground. Each hoplite covered, with his shield (carried on his left 
arm) not only himself but the right unprotected spear side of the hoplite standing to his left, 
while his own right side was covered by the shield of the hoplite standing on his right. During 
battle, the second to the last ranks (except, that is, the “front” line) thrusted the external sides 
of their shields on the backs of the hoplite in front of them, pushing forward, and being 
pushed by the hoplite behind them, in a tactic called “othismos”. Thus, the phalanx developed 
great strength in thrust, becoming a compact body that could push back in hand to hand 
fighting any other army type (cavalry or infantry) not being thus equipped, as demonstrated 
during the Greek–Persian Wars. As Xenofon (Hellenica. 7.1.38) wrote there were no Asians 
“able to stand up to Greeks in battle”, except of course other Greek phalanxes.  
 Victor Davis Hanson in his The Western Way of War asserts on the issue of the strength 
of the phalanx that “These men were the first we know of to relegate cavalry to a secondary 
role and thus to suppress for a thousand years to come the notion that the battlefield was the 
private domain of aristocratic horsemen. Nor did they have any liking for the landless poor, 
who were skilled only in missile attack. The hoplite class of the Greek classical age chose to 
ignore the low and the javelin in preference for the spear and massive bronze armour in a 
desire to eliminate entirely the critical “distance” that elsewhere traditionally separated men 
in battle”.12 
We do not have any extant data concerning the cost of the equipment of the hoplite, but 
it must have been relatively expensive. Only relatively well-off free landowners could afford 
it. Ancient Athens during the Persian invasions, for which we possess some information, 
permits us at least to estimate the number of hoplites and their percentage as to the total 
number of citizens. We know from Herodotus (Histories 6. 94-140), that the Athenian army at 
                                                 
12
 Hanson, The Western Way, 17.
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Marathon was 9-10.000 strong. Assuming that some (perhaps 2.000?) older classes of hoplites 
stayed behind at Athens as a reserve, we arrive at an estimate of 11-12.000 hoplites in 490 
BC, the year of the battle. 
Some additional information given by Herodotus for the year 482 BC, when 
Themistocles Naval Law was voted (and which as far as we know has not been used before) 
permits us a calculation of number of Athenian citizens. The Athenian Assembly voted for the 
construction of 100 warships (triremes) at a cost of a talent each, a talent being the equivalent 
of 6.000 drachmae. This gives a total cost for the naval shipbuilding programme of 600.000 
drachmae. We also know, that another proposal was put forward to the Assembly: The total 
sum should have been distributed on an equalitarian basis to all Athenian citizens, each 
citizen due to receive 10 drachmae. A division of the two sums (total cost by individual 
receipt) gives a total number of citizens for 482 BC of 60.000. 
Thus, during the early fifth century, only one in five citizens (or 20%) belonged to the 
well-off landowning farmers’ class that could afford hoplite armour. We believe that, with 
perhaps small variations, this proportion must have characterised all city-states, with the 
exception of Sparta, where one could be a citizen only if he was a hoplite, called an “equal”. 
In Sparta, the concepts of citizen and warrior-hoplite, merged, while in the other city-
states they had, as we will demonstrate in the next section, a close link. 
 
VALUES OF THE PHALANX AND VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 
A city-state culture was not a unique Greek development. 37 such cultures in Europe, 
Asia, Africa and Central America have been identified.
13
 What was unique for geometric and 
classical Greece, was the combination of city-state culture and the emergence of the heavily 
armed hoplite warrior and the phalanx formation. 
                                                 
13
 Mogen Herman Hansen, Polis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 5-12. 
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The hoplite and the phalanx developed together with city-state culture during the late 8
th
 
to 6
th
 centuries, and thus preceded by at about two hundred years the emergence of 
democracy. Evidence from pottery painting
14
 show that phalanx formations were already 
battling in full development during the 7
th
 century and even more so during the Spartan-
Messenian wars of the early sixth, while the first democracies emerged only during the 
beginning of the 6
th
 century, in some Greek Asia Minor city-states, on which we have only 
fragmentary evidence, in Athens by Solon (594-593 BC) and as a fully developed democracy 
only by Cleisthenes in 510-507 BC and after Themistocles Naval Law of 482 BC.
15
 
Thus, historical evidence points to an influence from the phalanx to democracy and not 
vice-versa, not even a development in parallel. Why should this be so? We maintain that this 
arose because the phalanx created a particular set of ideals and values, which then where 
translated in political values that shaped democracy. 
A widely held belief today is that democracy promotes individualism. This is true in the 
sense of safeguarding individual rights, but it was not true for the phalanx. Homeric 
aristocratic warriors were supreme individualists. Lightly armed ancient warriors, fighting in 
loose order, and with no such close contact as the hoplites in the phalanx, fought also 
relatively more as individuals, as did horsemen, who required more space between them to 
manoeuvre their horses. 
As we analysed in the previous section, the phalanx formation was very compact. The 
hoplites were standing very close one to another, and the middle ranks actually touching one 
                                                 
14
 A particular fine example being the mid-7
th
 century Corinthian wine amphora called the Chigi pottery, 
preserved in Villa Julia, Rome. It shows hoplites battling in phalanx formations. It antecedents Solonian 
democracy by about a 100 years. 
15
 For the development of democracy in ancient Athens, see Josiah Ober, Democracy and Knowledge: 
Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), chap. 2, 
3.  
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another through their shields on front and backs.
16
  In the phalanx, the hoplites were almost 
literally glued together. This close fitting order gave the phalanx its great strength, but it was a 
strength were individuals combined their personal strength into a greater, almost 
“transcendental” strength of the phalanx. In the phalanx warriors did not fight mainly as 
individuals, but as parts of a whole. The strength of the phalanx depended on unity. 
In such a formation, individual skill and courage, were subordinate to compactness and 
order. The phalanx moves forward and pushes as one, as a mass of shields, bodies and spears. 
Individuals took courage from one another, step with the same speed, the Spartans 
introducing even drums and fifes in order to facilitate the phalanx’s movement. In the 
phalanx, the first value that emerges, is equality. Equality in equipment (due to similar 
economic background) in position, in danger, in purpose. 
The main purpose is to impose the phalanx’s will on the enemy, to push him back, to 
compel him to retreat, to break and abandon the field of battle. The phalanx, through its tactic 
of “othismos” develops a common purpose, a common will. This equality and common 
purpose gave the phalanx its cohesion. A solidarity and ties of camaraderie
17
, a trust to the 
hoplite guarding your right, to the one pressing his shield on your back, as the hoplite on your 
left trusted you with his life. By the 7
th
 century BC, the hoplites had proven their superiority 
on the battlefield against any other type of warrior and army, be it aristocratic horsemen, or 
charioteers (like in Mycenaean Greece or Egypt of the New Kingdom or the Assyrian empire) 
or archers, javelin throwers or slingers. 
Having proven their supremacy in warfare, they became conscious of their strength also 
in politics. We do not know exactly how the process started and developed, but by the 7
th
 
                                                 
16
 For the development and the functioning of the phalanx formation during batle see Peter Krentz, “The Nature 
of Hoplite Battle,” Classical Antiquity, 4(1) (1985): 50-61 and Hanson, The Western Way,  chap. 12-13). 
17
 (ibid., chap. 10). 
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century a big political transformation had taken place: kingships did no more exist in central 
and southern Greece, as they were the norm during the Bronze Age. They existed only in the 
fringes of the Greek world where the phalanx was not yet adopted, like Macedon and Epirus, 
and in the mixed system of Sparta. What emerged, were oligarchies, of the relatively well-off 
citizens, the majority of which were of the hoplite class, and tyrannies, were some individuals 
seized power, but were again supported usually by a majority of the well-off citizens, hoplite-
landowners.
18
 
By the end of the 6
th
 century even this sort of political arrangement was deemed to be 
inadequate and a new from, direct democracy, was introduced. Democracy was based on 
transferring to the political sphere the values that had evolved and had been tested on the 
battlefield in the phalanx: The fact that the phalanx formation had developed as a means of 
self-defence of Greek city-states made necessary the participation in it the majority of citizens 
of each independent city-state, without any discrimination concerning the social status.
19
   
Thus, the value of equality which developed in the phalanx’s ranks became equality in 
politics, eg. equality in rights to vote, to be elected, but also legal rights. 
Solidarity, trust and camaraderie in battle were transformed in trust and solidarity in the 
political field. You are prepared to listen, to accept somebody’s opinion if you trust him with 
your life in battle, and you are willing to vote for him for public office and obey him for the 
duration of this office, as you do if you have elected and accepted him to lead you in battle. 
We do not know how military leaders were chosen up to the 6
th
 century BC, but we do know 
that at least by the end of this century, in Athens, the military leaders, the 10 Strategoi 
                                                 
18
 There were a few exceptions like the mid-sixth century Athenian Peisistratos, who it seem based his power in 
part at least to the poorer mountain dwelling Athenians and also to mercenaries. The fact that ancient historians 
point this out demonstrates that in their eyes it was an exception.
 
19
 Paul Cartledge, “Hoplites and Heroes: Sparta's Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare,” The 
Journal of Hellenic Studies, 97 (1977): 11-27. 
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(Generals), each the head of the armed contingent of each of the ten Athenian tribes) were 
elected democratically.
20
 So, election of military leaders might have again predated the 
introduction of democracy. 
In democracy, in parallel to the above values, one supreme ideal was developed, the 
ideal of common purpose, or social cohesion, which we believe again is transplanting the 
common purpose and the common will of the phalanx in the field of politics.
21
 In 
democracies, this supreme ideal was called homonoia (Plato Republic 5. 432A, 433C; Lysias 
Speeches. 25.30), literally “same-mindnesss”.22 Based again on this, the next “revolutionary” 
step in politics is no longer far, to base the validation of politics and the justification of 
democracy on the existence of a natural right that leads to the establishment of a social 
contract. Ancient Athenians did actually take this step in practise by the end of the 5
th
 century. 
For example, Antiphon the sophist wrote the Peri Homonoias, fragments of which were 
discovered in the 19
th
 century on a papyrus. On this fragment we have the first ever 
formulation of the theory of natural law and Social Contract. Pericles also, in his Funeral 
                                                 
20
 For the 10 Athenian Strategoi (Generals) see Greg R. Stanton, Athenian Politics, C. 800-500 B.C. : A 
Sourcebook (London: Rutledge, 1990), 19-20. 
21
 Aristotle, in a famous passage (Politics 1281b. 1-8) writes: “The many out of which none is great, may, when 
they assemble into a body, be better than the few, not each individually, but as a whole, like in the symposia that 
are organised by many together. As each of the many possesses an atom of virtue and knowledge, when they 
come together into a body, they become concerning ethics (morals) and thinking as one human, with many 
hands, many legs and many sensations”. We believe that there could not be a better description of the phalanx, 
although Aristotle uses the passage as a justification of democracy. This again, is supporting our analysis of the 
relation between the phalanx and democracy. 
22
 Homonoia is usually being translated as concord, but Paul Cartledge in a personal communication suggested to 
us that a better translation could be “same-mindness” and unanimity, which is stronger than concord. Another 
major value was isonomia, which refers to political systems were means equality in front of the law exists, but 
not electoral rights, to vote and be elected. 
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Speech (as given by Thucydides) illustrates the concept of homonoia among the ideals of 
democracy.
23
              
 The influence of values developed during two centuries of phalanx warfare on the 
emergence of democracy can be analysed also as a case of bounded rationality.
24
 Instead of 
searching for total new solutions in a new political setting, values that have been established 
through “trial and error” and tested on the battlefield, are introduced and adopted in politics. 
Finding that these values are adequate in the new political settings, agents have no longer an 
incentive to devote further resources (time for information, trial and error etc.) to discover 
new ones.
25
 
The historical evidence and our analysis thus indicates that phalanx warfare antecedated 
the introduction of democracy, and that values evolved in the phalanx evolved into 
democratic values. Still, there were historical cases were city-states using the phalanx were 
not democracies (like Sparta)
26
 or were oscillating between democracy – oligarchy and 
                                                 
23
 These existed two Athenians by the name of Antiphon. The first one is the so-called Antiphon the sophist, 
known to posterity as a discussant with Socrates, (Xenophon Memorabilia), the second one being one of the “ten 
Athenian orators” of the so-called Canon. See Konstantinos Tsatsos, “Rhetoric,” in History of the Greek Nation, 
Γ2, (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1972), 548-565 (in Greek). For analytical view of the implementation of a social 
contract in practise through the fiscal expansionary policy programs of Euboulos and Lykourgos during the 
second half of the 4
th
 century in ancient Athens, see Nicholas Kyriazis and Emmanouil Marios L. Economou, 
“Social Contract, Public Choice and Fiscal Repercussions in Classical Athens,” Paper Presented at the 12th Erfurt 
Conference on Fiscal Sociology, in October 12, 2012, in Erfurt. 
24
 For the theory of Bounded Rationality see Herbert Simon, “Bounded Rationality and Organisational 
Learning,” Organisation Science 2(1) (1991): 125-134. 
25
 Nicholas Kyriazis, Why Ancient Greece? (Athens: Psychogios Publications, 2012), 17-22. 
26
 Sparta had a particular “constitution”. It was governed by two kings, who were usually but not always the 
military commanders, five ephors, who were more or less the governing body, 30 gerousiaste who were a kind 
of senate, and a popular assembly of all adult male citizens, who voted on proposals made by the ephors, but 
14 
 
 
tyranny, as eg. Argos, Syracuse, Halkis, Eretria, Istiaia and other city-states on the island of 
Euboea during the 4
th
 century, and Messina, Catanae and many other city-states in Sicily and 
lower Italy during the 5
th
 and 6
th
 century. 
Historical evidence indicates thus that although the phalanx was a necessary condition 
for democracy, it was not a sufficient one. The hoplites-landowners class showed 
ambivalence between democracy, “limited democracy” (eg. democracy according to wealth 
criteria, like the Solonian Athenian of 560 BC, the short-lived 411 BC in Athens and the 
Athenian democracy after 322 BC) and oligarchy. During the 5
th
 and 4
th
 century some Greek 
city-states took a further decisive step, taking a “turn to the sea”.27 They transformed 
themselves from mainly land powers into sea-maritime powers. This transformation deepened 
democracy and gave it strength and durability. 
Most ancient maritime city-states were democracies as long as they were maritime 
powers (with very short-lived non democratic “intermissions” as for Athens during 404-403 
BC after the end of the Peloponnesian War). Samos, Corinth, Chios, Byzance, Rhodes (during 
the late 4
th
 and 3
rd
 centuries) and of course Athens. Already, ancient authors, such as Aristotle 
(Politics 1304a18-24; 1274a12-14) had recognized the link between democracy and 
seapower.
28
 In the following section we analyse why seapower is almost a sufficient condition 
for democracy. 
                                                                                                                                                        
only on a yes or no basis, without having the authority to introduce or change proposals. P. J. Rhodes, The Greek 
City States: A Source Book (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 58-60 considers Sparta’s political 
system as a “peculiar kind of oligarchy”. On Sparta’s values and norms, see also George Bitros and Anastasios 
Karayannis, “Morality, Institutions and the Wealth of Nations: Some Lessons From Ancient Greece,” European 
Journal of Political Economy 26 (2010): 68-81. 
27
 Nicholas Kyriazis, “Seapower and Socioeconomic Change,” Theory and Society 35 (2006): 71-108. 
28
 Ioannis Theodorakopoulos, “Aristoteles,” History of the Greek Nation  Γ2, (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1972) 
486-511 (in Greek). 
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SEAPOWER, DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS  
We analyse the relation of seapower, democracy and the community of interests with 
the case study of Athens, which was both the prototype democracy and for which we possess 
sufficient information from ancient sources to enable us to trace its transformation from a land 
to a seapower and from a tyranny into democracy. 
During the sixth century, Athenian political history was chequered: Solon introduced a 
limited form of democracy in 594 BC, based on wealth criteria, which was abolished by the 
tyrant Peesistratos and his sons during 561-510 Then, Cleisthenes introduced a more 
encompassing form of democracy in 510-507, but still a limited one, because seemingly the 
poorer Athenians (about 80% of the total according to our previous calculations) had the right 
to vote, but not yet the right to be elected.
29
  
In 482 BC, Themistocles introduced his Naval Law, which was voted in the Assembly 
and initiated Athens’ “turn to the sea”.30 For the next 160 years, up to the Athenian defeat by 
the Macedonian fleet at Amorgos in 322 BC, Athens was the dominant seapower in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the most representative democracy of the time. 
The Naval Law revolutionized Athenian politics. Each warship, the trireme, required 
under normal conditions 180 rowers, 12 hoplites (as “marines”), 15 sailors (or “deck crew”), 
the master, the Keleustes (who beat the drum setting the various speeds of the ship) and the 
                                                 
29
 Andrew R. Burn, Persia and the Greeks. The Defence of the West, C. 546-478 B.C. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1984, reprint), 279-297. 
30
 Nicholas Kyriazis and Michail Zouboulakis (2004), “Democracy, Sea Power and Institutional Change: An 
Economic Analysis of the Athenian Naval Law,” European Journal of Law and Economics 17 (2004): 117-132; 
John R. Hale, Lords of the Sea: The Triumph and Tragedy of Ancient Athens (London: Gibson Square Books, 
chap. 2. 
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commander called trierarchos.
31
 The about 180 Athenian ships present at Salamis required 
thus 32.400 rowers, and these could be provided only by the lower income class Athenians, 
the thetes, who up to then did not have political rights and did not provide military service, 
lacking the means to acquire the expensive hoplite equipment.
32
  
We suggest that in special cases, as in Salamis, where the proximity of the land 
provided the necessary water and alimentation, and the narrow straights, which did not permit 
much manoeuvring by the ships but mainly direct confrontation, as was the tactical intention 
of Themistocles, the Athenian and Greek ships in general would have carried more hoplites 
than the usual 12. Under normal conditions, 200 ships would require 2.400 hoplites. We know 
from Marathon that Athens had at least 10.000 hoplites, and it seems absurd if the rest of 
them stood idle while the decisive battle took place! 
But as rowers, they provided, for the first time in Athenian history military service, and 
thus, as explicitly promised by Themistocles when he brought his proposal to the Assembly, 
they acquired full political rights. All state positions (eg. “government”, law courts, military 
ones) were open to them.
33
 
                                                 
31
 John Morrison, John Coates and N.B. Rankov, The Athenian Trireme: The History and Reconstruction of an 
Ancient Greek Warship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 158-159. 
32
 Each hoplite had to buy his own armor by his own means in order to participate in the phalanx formation. See 
Kurt A. Raaflaub, “The Breakthroug of Demokratia on mid-Fifth Century Athens,” in Origins of Democracy in 
Ancient Greece, eds. K. A. Raauflaub, J. Ober, R. W. Wallace, P. Cartledge, and C. Farrar (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2007), 129. 
33
 For the financing of the Athenian fleet through trierarchy, which was the most expensive liturgy, see Brooks 
A. Kaiser, “The Athenian Trierarchy: Mechanism for the Private Provision of Public Goods,” Journal of 
Economic History 67 (2007): 4445-4480; Vincent Gabrielsen, Financing the Athenian Fleet (Baltimore, 
Meryland: John Hopkins University Press, 2010 repr.), chap. 1, 8. For the economic effects of the Athenian turn 
to the sea, see Kyriazis and Zouboulakis, “Democracy, Sea Power,” 117-132. 
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A trireme was a microcosm of Athenian society, combining all its elements: The 170 
rowers from the poorer class, who on land could have been less prosperous farmers, unskilled 
workers working for a daily wage etc., 12 hoplites of the more prosperous classes (self 
employed prosperous farmers but also some skilled workers and artisans, whose proportion 
increased rapidly as Athens was transformed from a mainly agricultural to a mainly 
“industrial” and services” economy).34 The sailors who belonged also probably to the middle, 
“skilled” class, and three “officers”, specialists who belonged to the prosperous upper classes. 
The ship’s commander, the trierarch, certainly belonged to the wealthy class, and had to 
finance out of his own means the running expenses of the ship for one operational period 
(about 7-8 months per year). 
With the Athenian transformation into a seapower, all its citizens gave military service 
(and not just our estimate of the 20% wealthier ones who fought as hoplites) and acquired full 
political rights. Athens (and presumably the same applied to the other Greek seapowers) was 
no more an “elite democracy” of the relative by wealthier citizens, but an all-encompassing 
one. The values evolved in the phalanx, equality, trust, common purpose and will, applied 
also to the trireme’s crew. The different groups of men on the ship had to combine into a 
whole in order to have an efficient fighting ship, on which victory and the survival of 
everybody depended. The important point is that these common values extended now also to 
the poorer citizens, who before were excluded as they did not participate in the phalanx. 
Figure 1 summarizes this argument: It shows how a set of values evolves and enforces 
the adoption of further related values as an iterative process. Supposing for example that in 
time period 1, two values that have been cultivated through the phalanxes and the trireme, 
                                                 
34
 For this transformation, leading Athens to become the “first modern economy”, see George Halkos and 
Nicholas Kyriazis, “The Athenian economy in the age of Demosthenes,” European Journal of Law and 
Economics 29 (2010): 255-277 and the references given there. 
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such as trust (cycle 1) and will (cycle 2), affect each other, then, a new relative value such as 
common purpose or homonoia (cycle 3) might also be adopted in the next step (time period 
2). Then, if at time period 2 this is the case, the mutual interaction of the three values (cycles 
1, 2 and 3) might also lead to the adoption of a next value, say equality (cycle 4) on time 
period 3. This process might lead to an ongoing process of creating values in the next time 
periods (period 4 etc). 
 
Fig. 1 Integration of a series of values to a new coherent whole  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                        1 
                                                                                               2                3                       
                                                                                                         4                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                                          
                                                                            
                                                                 
                     1                        2                        3                       4                                
time period: t 
 
Under this simple figure we attempted to show how values that have been cultivated 
through warfare may lead to a coherent system of norms and ideas. But the combination of 
different skills (which were not present in the phalanx were every hoplite had more or less the 
same equipment and the same skills) had a further great importance for the working of 
democracy: As on the trireme everybody listened and obeyed the expert (eg. the rowers to the 
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Keleustes rhythm, everybody to the sailors when sailing with sails, to the master (who was the 
expert on navigation and sea conditions) or to the commander in battle), as citizens the 
Athenians applied their military experience
35
 to the Assembly: the learned to listen and be 
guided by the experts. 
On the triremes the Athenians acquired two very important types of knowledge: First 
the nautical combination of skills into a whole, and second the general idea, that some people 
were the experts and it made sense to listen to them. We suggest that this “being guided by 
the expert” was one of the most valuable lessons from service on ships, on which the efficient 
running and the duration and stability of Athenian democracy was based.
36
 
Athenian political culture was thus to a great degree taken over from its naval-military 
culture. The shared experience, the bonds of trust and common purpose generated onboard the 
ships worked also as a general “glue of democracy”. On board a trireme, poor rowers became 
well acquainted with the hoplites, but also with the wealthy commanders, in a way that he 
would never have the opportunity to acquire in “civil” life. 
We get a glimpse of how important this was for Athenian political culture from the 
forensic speeches of the 4
th
 century: Defendants and accusers always mention and take pride 
from their military service as trierarchs, and know well that this reminder will positively 
influence the judges, citizens elected by lot, the majority of whom would have already served 
                                                 
35
 It must be underlined, that since after Salamis the Athenian fleet, for all the 160 years of Athenian supremacy 
was always in operation (in various, but in general substantial strength) every Athenian citizen acquired this 
experience.
 
36
 In modern terms, we would speak of “knowledge aggregation”. See Josiah Ober, Democracy and Knowledge, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), chap. 4 (networks, teams and experts) and chap. 5 (alignment: 
common knowledge, commitment and coordination) on this issue but without addressing the military influence 
on politics, as we do here. 
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on the triremes, some even on the particular ship or ships commanded and financed by the 
person giving the speech at the court.
37
 
Lastly, the durability of the Athenian democracy was based on a community of 
economic interests. The transformation into a maritime power benefited (perhaps to different 
degrees) all Athenians: poor Athenians benefited from the remuneration (out of the public 
budget) as rowers on the triremes, but also as workers on the extended public works 
programmes (there were two main periods, one during 450-430 BC under Pericles and one 
under Lycurgus, 338-323 BC), but also as workers on the harbour services, the market place, 
or self-employed artisans, but also when doing remunerated public service as members of 
juries (courts) officials elected by lot, participating at the Assembly etc.    
 The middle (hoplite) classes benefited from higher prices for their agricultural products 
(which tended towards specialised high quality-high price products, some for the export 
markets, like honey, figs, olive oil, wool, wines, instead of bulk goods like cereals), but also 
as skilled artisans, artists etc. (Stone masons, shoe makers, jewellery makers, potters and in 
general independent manufacturers) and in the services sector, as eg. sailors on merchant 
vessels. The rich benefited as entrepreneurs in manufacturing, merchants, bankers etc.
 38 
Homonoia and social cohesion was based in the Athenian case and we believe also in the 
other maritime Greek states for which we lack sufficient information, on common interest and 
prosperity.  
                                                 
37
 Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 53-73 
presents and analyses such cases. 
38
 These exists a substantial and growing literature on the ancient Athenian economy. See for example Edward 
Cohen, Athenian Economy and Society: A Banking Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 
chap. 1, 5-6; Takeshi Amemiya, Economy and Economics in Ancient Greece, (London: Routledge, 2007), chap. 
2; George Bitros and Anastasios Karayannis (note 26: 68-81) and Halkos and Kyriazis (note 33: 255-277).
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Table 1 summarizes our findings: It shows that the values that gradually developed as 
an entail of the functioning of the phalanx and the triremes, such as self-consciousness, 
cooperation, cohesion, homonoia (same-mindness), equality, trust, solidary etc (figure 1) were 
“diffused” from warfare to the political field and became self-consciousness isonomia 
(equality to the law), isegoria (freedom of speech ), homomoia, concord and patriotism. 
Democracy seems to have gone hand in hand with cohesion and solidarity throughout all over 
the Athenian society. Thus, Athenians achieved what the ancient politician Demades referred 
to as “the glue of democracy”.          
 Athenians found it beneficial to entrust their future prosperity as citizens, on ambitious 
politicians that had already proven their capabilities in warfare, such as Themistocles, 
Pericles, Cimon etc. Entrusting government to former successful military men seems to have 
been a common practice even in recent historical cases, such as the United States (George 
Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses Grant, Dwight Eisenhower) and France (Napoleon 
Bonaparte, Charles De Gaulle) etc.   
Values that have been established through “trial and error” and tested on the battlefield 
were democratically introduced and adopted in politics aswell. Under this method, the 
Athenians had the aptitude to introduce ready to use solutions when complex issues seemed to 
have driven to stalemate by utilising the skills of their leaders. 
Finally, the case of the Athenian Democracy approves, that democratic procedures can 
lead to positive outcomes. Under concord, homonoia and coordination, cohesion, trust, etc 
which better emerge voluntarily through democratic procedures, a community of interests that  
leads to a Pareto better or a positive sum game situation (in economic terms) can be achieved, 
as the case of the recruitment of the poor Athenians in the fleet (during the 5
th
 century) or the 
expanded public works programmes (during the 2
nd
 half of the 4
th
 century BC) approve. 
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Table 1: Transformation and diffusion of military into political values 
Values 
Warfare 
mechanisms 
 Military values                          Means  
Emerging political 
values 
Hoplites and 
phalanx 
formation 
 
Triremes 
 
 
 
 
self-
consciousness 
cooperation 
cohesion 
“homonoia” 
(same-mindness) 
equality, 
trust 
obedience 
teamwork 
solidary 
 
 
 
bounded 
rationality 
 
 
 
adaptation of 
known values, 
solutions, 
networks, 
“cues”. 
 
“cognitive 
glue” 
 
 
being Guided 
by the expert 
 
  
    Self-consiusness  
 
isonomia 
(equality) 
 
isegoria 
(freedom of speech ) 
 
homomoia 
 
concord 
 
coordination 
 
patriotism 
 
Abiding by 
Assembly’s and 
courts decisions, 
obeying the law  
 
community of 
interests  
 
positive sum game 
 
 
Conclusions 
We have analysed the emergence of the new warrior, the hoplite, and the new tactical 
formation, the phalanx, and the values they created. Then, we traced the influence of these 
values on the emergence of democracy and its values and we suggested that the hoplite and 
the phalanx was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for democracy. 
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We then traced the turn to the sea of some city-states, taking Athens as a case study and 
established it as a sufficient condition for ancient democracy. Further areas of research are the 
analysis of other city-state cultures (among those identified eg. by Hansen’s Polis39) to see if 
similar links between military developments and democracy can be established. A particular 
interesting example would be the examination of the Phoenician maritime city-states like Tyre 
and Sidon and their form of government, or the Greek proto-federations that mainly emerged 
during the 4
th
 century BC, such as the Achaean and the Aetolian Leagues.
40
  
Further, European late medieval and Renaissance states should be analysed to 
demonstrate if similar developments took place. We believe that the Swiss case does show a 
similar pattern: The Swiss adopted during the 14
th
 and 15
th
 century a phalanx formation
41
 and 
developed direct democracy as a government, which they use till today. 
Also, some recent studies
42
 indicate that in the early modern period, sea and maritime 
powers, like the United Provinces (Dutch Republic) in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century and England, 
were more democratic (although not real democracies) than any other contemporary state. In 
addition, other authors
43
 underline the link between sea and maritime power and the 
community of interests it creates. 
Further research into this area, including also the Italian maritime medieval and 
Renaissance city-states like Venice and Genoa, we believe, it will prove fruitful. 
                                                 
39
 (note 13: 7-24). 
40
 We propose such an analysis in a series of forthcoming papers. 
41
 See Charles Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages 378-1515 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1885 
repr. 1968), ch. V; Douglas Miller, “The Swiss at War, 1300-1500”, Osprey Men at Arms 94 (1979): 4-40. 
42
  Kyriazis, “Seapower and Socioeconomic Change,” 71-108. 
43
 Jan Glete, Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America 1500–1860, 
Almquist and Wiksell International, 1993), Vol. 1; Nicholas Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea (London: Harper 
Collins Publishers, 1997), chap. 17. 
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